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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HENRY HAYWARD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
J. R. DOWNING and J.
ELDREDGE,

WAYNE

7216

Defendants and Appellants,
and
LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE

WRIGHT, his Guardian ad litem,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.
J. R. DOWNING and J.
ELDREDGE,

72'17

WAYNE

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF T·HE CASE
The above cases were by stipulation of the parties,
consolidated for appeal. Both cases have previously been
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before this court and were decided on the 5th day of February, 1948 and entitled Hayward vs. Downing and Wright
vs. Downing, 189 Pac. (2nd) 442. The facts in the cases at
bar, so far as plaintiffs' cases are concerned, are in all respects the same as the facts in the cases previously decided
by this court. In the previous trial the court granted the
defendant's motion for a non-suit, the defendants not presenting any evidence. In the cases at bar the defendants
presented their evidence, which in certain respects contradicted the evidence of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contended that they had been given permission by the defendant
Downing to sit upon the platform in question. The defenddant Downing denies that he ever gave such permission and
certain other witnesses were introduced on behalf of the
defendants to the effect that patrons were not allowed to sit
upon the platform and that at the time of the accident in
question the plaintiffs and others were scuffling and
wrestling upon the platform. The jury, in deciding the cases
at bar, apparently was unimpressed with the denial and
other evidence of the defendants and found the issues
against them and in favor of plaintiffs.
For the purpose of this appeal it is not necessary to
elaborate upon the evidence, the plaintiff's evidence having
been fully set ·forth in the prior appeal of this matter and
the defendants contention being fully set forth in their
brief in the matter now before the court. The defendants
have assigned eight statements of errors upon which they
rely for a reversal of the judgment entered in these cases.
Both cases were consolidated for the purpose of trial and
the jury made and entered its separate verdict for each of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the plaintiffs, making and entering a judgment in the sum
of $3,000.00 for Lynn D. Wright, one of the plaintiffs and
a judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 for Henry Hayward, the
other plaintiff. It will be noted by an examination of the
appellants brief that although they assigned eight statements of errors upon which they rely for a reversal of the
judgment entered herein, they have classified the errors
under six divisions in their brief and the respondent's will
confine their reply to appellant's brief in the same order
and under the same headings as set forth in respondent's
brief.

ARGUMENT
1.

THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED ON THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

It is the claim and contention of the appellants that the

court was in error in failing to give certain of its requests,
particularly its requests for instruction Nos. 8 (Tr. 67), 9
(Tr. 68), 10 (Tr. 69), and 11 (Tr. 70) all of which requested
instructions are set forth in full at pages 12 and 13 of appellant's brief. Generally assumption of risk is applied to
cases involving the relationship of master and servant. This
is so because ordinarily the servant knows and appreciates
the dangers involved in his work and is as well aware of
them as the master and having such knowledge, and if he
does the work with full appreciation of the dangers involved, he is said to have assumed the risk. It is conceivable
that the doctrine of assumption of risk might be applied
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to eases not involving the relationship of master and servant.
We agree with the statement of this court in the case of
Kuchenmeister vs. L. A. & S. L. R. R. Company, 52 Ut. 116,
172 Pac. 725, to the effect that there is a clear distinction
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
An examination of the facts of that case will indicate that
the defendant had provided the plaintiff with a reasonably
safe place in which he could have been safely carried to his
destination and that he of his own volition and through
intelligent choice, left the place where he was safe and chose
one that was extremely dangerous, being well aware of the
dangers involved.
This court however, merely discussed assumption of
risk in that case but does not say that it applys to the plaintiff in the case, the case finally going off on another theory.
But it will be noted from the facts that the plaintiff was
well aware of the dangerous position he was placing himself
in by leaving the place of safety, and had not the case involved other matters the court might well have said that the
plaintiff in that case assumed the risk.
The case of Edwards vs. So. R. R. Company, 169 So.
715, 106 A. L. R. 1133 (Ala.) cited by the appellants at page
16 of their brief, states the rule of assumption of risk to be,
"that it must be confined to cases where the plaintiff
knew and appreciated the dangers assumed, and with
such knowledge and appreciation voluntarily put
himself in the way of it."
The appellants state at page 11 of their brief in an attempt
to bring themselves within the above quoted rule, that it can
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reasonably be inferred that the plaintiffs were conscious
of the possible hazards of sitting on the platform particularly
because some weeks before the accident the floor of the platform had "bent a little."
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the platform had bent some weeks before, didn't the plaintiffs have
the right to assume that any weakened condition in the platform had been remedied by the defendants, particularly
when the defendants were continually consenting to and
permitting the boys to sit upon the platform? There is not
a scintilla of evidence in the entire record that the plaintiffs
knew or appreciated any danger whatsoever in connection
with the platform. In fact, the record 1s undisputed that the
boys did not know that there was any danger connected with
their sitting upon the platform. The burden was upon the
defendants to explain how the platform collapsed. This
they did not do. Further, the burden was upon the defendants to show that the plaintiffs knew that the platform was
dangerous at the time of the accident in question. This
also the defendants failed to show. Certainly the plaintiffs
after having obtained permission to sit upon the platform
had a right to assume that it was safe. How the defendants
can argue that the doctrine of assumption of risk is applicable to this case is beyond comprehension. There is absolutely
no evidence in the record at all that the plaintiffs knew or
appreciated the danger of the platform or that the same
was dangerous. And if the same had been dangerous and
the defendants knew of the dangerous condition then it
would have been their duty to ,have warned the plaintiffs
of the dangerous condition. The testimony quoted on Page
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11 and 12 of the appellant's brief is the testimony appellants
reply upon to show that the plaintiffs knew and appreciated
the dangers involved in their sitting upon the platform. The
testimony therein set forth is merely opinion testimony, it
being merely the opinion of one of the defendant's witnesses,
a mere conclusion which the witness drew from the condition
which existed at the defendants place of business.

It would have been gross error for the court to have
instructed the jury on the question of assumption of risk
when there was no testimony whatsoever upon which to
base such an instruction.
2.

THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATE-LY INSTRUCTED ON T'HE DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

Under the above statement of error the defendants
contend that the court erred in failing to give its. instruction No. 3 (Tr. 62) and in modifying its instruction No.4
(Tr. 63) and in giving instruction No. 7 (Tr. 50) all of
which instructions are set forth o:n page 17 and 18 of the
appellants brief.
Defendants request No.3 is as follows:
"You are instructed that, if you find that the
plaintiff by his acts or conduct other than merely
sitting upon the platform caused, or in any manner,
no matter how slight, contributed to the accident, he
cannot recover and your verdict must be in favor
of the defendants NO CAUSE OF ACTION."
The above request of course is not a proper statement
of the law and the defendants cannot complain of the refusal of the court to give the same.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Suppose that the plaintiffs pursuant to the permis'sion
given them by the defendants, were merely in the process of
getting upon the platform and had to stand upon the same
before they could sit down and in moving around to get in
a position of sitting, the platform collapsed, then according
to the above instruction plaintiffs could not recover which,
of course is not the law.
The court modified defendants request No. 4 in its
instruction No. 7 by adding "and that such conduct on the
part of plaintiff was what a reasonably prudent person would
not have done under the facts and circumstances then and
there existing." The defendant's question the above
language contending at page 19 of their brief, that it permits the jury to measure the plaintiffs conduct under the
rule of conduct of that of a reasonably prudent person and
further contending that it allows them to go beyond the permission granted them. Apparently it is the defendants
contention that the plaintiffs should not have acted as reasonably prudent persons while upon the platform but should
have acted like an unreasonably person. That is, the only
conclusion that can be drawn from defendants argument in
this connection. The instruction as given by the court
clearly informs the jury that if the plaintiffs scuffled or
wrestled on the platform and didn't act like a reasonable
person would and that such conduct in any way contributed
to the giving away of the platform, then the plaintiffs, could
not recover. What more could the defendants ask in this
respect?
It is elementary that boys of the age of the plaintiffs
herein, to-wit, 16 years, of age, are not held to that same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

standard of care as an adult but are only required to exercise that degree of care which boys of similiar age, experience and intelligence exercise under the same or similiar
circumstances. The instruction as given by the court is much
more favorable to the defendants than the law requires.
Defendants requested instruction No. 4 (Tr. 63), set
forth at page 18 of appellants brief, does not set forth any
rule or standard of conduct and it would have been error for
the trial court to have given the same without limiting it in
someway to what a reasonably prudent person would have
done. The plaintiffs deny that they were wrestling and
scuffling in any manner and the jury from its verdict was
inclined to believe them and to disbelieve the testimony
given by defendants.

3.

THE JURY WAS NOT ADE.QUATELY INSTRUCTED ON THE QUESTION OF "EXPRESS" .CONSENT OR PERMISSION, THE
LAW OF THE CASE.

The defendants complain here that the court did not
fully instruct the jury in accordance with the opinion of
this court rendered in the prior appeal of the matter. This
court held in the prior appeal of this matter of Hayward
vs. Downing and Wright vs. Downing, 189 Pac. (2nd) 442,
and at Tr. 11 herein, "Our holding is limited strictly to the
facts of this case-where an invitee ·as to one part of the
premises, receives permission to go upon another part of
the premises in furtherance of the object or purpose for
which he was originally invited upon the premises (in this
case, to view the wrestling matches) he becomes an inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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vitee as to such second part of the premises. As to other
and different fact situations, we express no opinion." Nowhere in the law, as expressed by this court in the prior
appeal of this matter, is the phrase "express. consent" or
"express permission" discussed. The court did, in discussing the facts of this case, state that one of the defendants
had expressly consented to the plaintiffs sitting upon the
platform, but in discussing the law of the case, the court
merely states that where the plaintiff has permission to go
to another part of the premises in furtherance of the object
or purpose for which he was originally invited, that he
then becomes an invitee as to the other part of the premises.
Defendants, in their discussion of this matter are making a mountain out of a mole hill. They are grasping for
any little thing they can in hopes of aiding their futile cause.
Plaintiff's evidence is clear that they obtained the permission of the defendant Downing, to sit upon the platform
and to there view the wrestling matches. To now argue, in
view of that testimony, that the court meant that the jury
must be instructed that they received "express" permission,
is obviously an attempt upon the part of the defendants to
read something in to the prior decision of this court. Permission can only mean one thing and that is, that the plaintiffs were permitted or authorized to sit upon the platform
and does not mean that the defendants directed them to sit
there but that they acquiesced in plaintiff's request that they
be permitted to sit upon the platform in pursuance of the
invitation to witness the wrestling matches. The court
continually, throughout its instructions to the jury, informed the jury that the jury must find by a preponderance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the evidence that the plaintiffs had permission to· sit
upon the platform before the plaintiffs could be considered
invitees of the defendant so far as the platform was concerned. In instruction No. 2 the court used the word permission once, in Instruction No.4 twice, in Instruction No.
5, twice, once in Instruction No. 6 and twice in Instruction No.7.
It is interesting to note that the defendants complain

of the courts Instruction No. 7. An examination of this
instruction (Tr. 50) and which is fully set forth at page
20 of defendants brief, is the same as defendants request
for Instruction No.5 (Tr. 34) and is the only request made
by the defendants in which they requested the use of the
phrase "express" permission. If the court had, in each
of its instructions, stated that the plaintiffs had to have
"express" permission it would have been error because the
court then would have been over-emphasizing the issue of
permission .. It is obvious from a reading of the prior opinion,
that this court did not mean that express permission had
to be given-whatever express permission means.-The only
requirement that this court made in its decision was that
the plaintiffs have permission to go to some other part of
the premises in furtherance of the object of the invitation.
Defendants also complain that the court erred in refusing to grant their request No. 7 (Tr. 66), and fully set
forth at page 21 of their brief. An examination of that
request would indicate that it is contrary to the opinion
of this court. The defendants there request the court to
instruct the jury that before the plaintiffs can recover, they
must show that they were directed by the defendants to sit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where the accident occurred. This, of course, is not the law.
This court merely held, in its prior decision, that all that
was necessary was permission in furtherance of the object
of the invitation. If the plaintiffs were required to prove
that they were directed to sit upon the platform before they
could recover, then, of course, the plaintiffs would not be
within the definition of "invitee" as set forth by this court
in its prior opinion of this matter.
4. THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE ANY EMPHASIS TO THE DENIALS OF PLAINTIFFS'
CONTENTION.
Th~

defendants complain that the court erred in refusing to give their Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 37) fully set
forth at page 22 of their brief and complain that the court
erred in giving its Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 49). It is the
defendants contention that the failure to give Instruction
No. 8 and the giving of Instruction No. 6, prejudiced them
by not emphasizing the defendants' evidence that no permission was given the plaintiffs. The matter of permission
was discussed in Statement of Error No.3 and it is obvious
from an examination of Instruction Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7
that the court continually instructed the jury that permission from the defendants was necessary before the plaintiffs
could recover.
In Instruction No. 1, the court told the jury that the
defendants deny that they had given plaintiffs permission
to sit upon platform. In Instruction No. 6 the court, in
effect, states that the defendants deny permission was
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given, and further in Instruction No.7 the court instructed
the jury that before plaintiffs can recover they must show
that "express permission" was given.
The defendants claim that the instructions given by
the court do not state the legal effect of the want of permission. An examination of the instructions however will
indicate that the contention of the defendants is incorrect.
In all of the instructions the court clearly stated to the jury
that it was necessary for plaintiffs to have permission in
order to recover.
Defendants complain that the court erred in failing to
give their requested Instruction No. 8. An examination of
the request will show that the matters set forth in the request were fully covered in the court's Instruction No. 6.
In the requested Instruction No. 8, the defendants wanted
the court to instruct that if they (the jury) believed from
the evidence that the alcove or platform was constructed
for some other purpose than for patrons to sit or stand on
and that plaintiffs were not given permission to sit there,
then plaintiffs couldn't recover.
It was not contended anywhere in the pleading nor during the trial of the matter that the platform was constructed
for the purpose of seating or standing patrons, but it was
clear from the evidence that the plaintiffs did have permission to sit upon the platform and to there view the
wrestling matches and. according to this court's ruling in
the prior decision of this matter, where plaintiffs were
given permission to go upon another part of the premises
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in furtherance of their invitation, then they were invitees
as to that portion of the premises and the defendants owed
them the duty of exercising reasonable care to see that that
portion of the premises was in a reasonable save condition.
The requested instruction contains three separate and
distinct matters and the first portion of the instruction
would have been misleading to the jury and would no doubt,
have prejudiced the plaintiff's case if it had been given
because, and, as stated before, there was no contention that
the platform was constructed as a sitting place.
The defendants further complain of the court's Instruction No. 6. An examination of that instruction (Tr. 49)
with defendants requested Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 35) will
indicate that the two are identical excep~ that the court
added the words "in the exercise of ordinary care he could
see." The defendants do not complain of the courts adding
the above phrase. They complain of the courts having given
Instruction No. 6, notwithstanding that they requested it.
Instruction No. 6 covers everything that the defendants
requested in Instruction No. 8 and says again that plaintiffs
must have permission before they can recover.
No where in defendants requests do they request the
court to emphasize the fact that they deny that they gave
permission and the defendants have not pointed out in their
brief how the court could have more fully instructed the
jury as to the necessity of permission and their denial of
it than the court has already done.
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5.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
NOT SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY TO TEST THE GENERAL VERDICT.

The defendants requested the court in their Instruction
No. 12, (Tr. 71) to submit to the jury a special interrogatory
which the defendants claim would test the general verdict as
rendered by the jury. The defendants were frank enough
at page 25 of their brief to quote Section 104-25-2 U. C. A.
1943 which leaves the matter of special interrogatories to
the sound discretion of the trial court, but, contend the defendants, the failure of the trial court in the instant case
to give their special interrogatory was prejudicial error.
Let us exa:rpine the special interrogatory which is as
follows:
"You are instructed that in connection with
your general verdict in this case, whether it be for
the plaintiff or whether it be for the defendants,
that you are required to answer the following question or interrogatory:
"Question: Did either one of the defendants tell
the plaintiff or his companions that he, the said
plaintiff, or his companions, might sit on the platform or alcove on the night the accident occurred?
"Answer: ............... .
"The foregoing interrogatory shall be answered
either yes or no, and 6 of the jurors concurring may
make answer to the interrogatory by the foreman."
The question which is set forth above is contrary to
the law of this case as decided by this court in its prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opinion; is contrary to the evidence and is absolutely contrary to the defendants contention as set forth in their brief
on this appeal.
In the first place, there was nothing in the evidence to
indicate that "either one" of the defendants told the plaintiffs or their companions that they might sit on the platform. The evidence is conclusive that the defendant Downing was the only one of the defendants to give permission
and as the court repeatedly stated in its instruction, before
plaintiffs could recover they had to show permission and
this matter is fully covered and particularly in Instruction
No. 7. All through defendants brief they contend that the
holding of this court in its prior opinion of this matter was
that the plaintiffs must have "express permission" then in
their special interrogatory they wanted the trial court to
submit to the jury the question "Did either one of the defendants tell the plaintiffs or his companions." The question
would, according to defendants if it had of been submitted
to the jury, have been contrary to this court's prior decision
in not using the phrase "express permission."
Instruction No. 7, and many instructions before, all
told the jury that they must find permission before plaintiffs could recover. To have submitted the interrogatory as
requested by defendants would not have added anything of
value to the jury's verdict because the jury had to find
permission before they could find for plaintiffs. As defendants contend, the jury of course, must find that permission was given before they could return a verdict for the
plaintiffs and this was the controlling fact in the whole case.
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The court emphasizing over and over again that permission
was necessary was to the plaintiff's harm and to the defendant's advantage.

6.

THE SUGGESTION BY WAY OF ARGUMENT
OF AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE WAS PREJUUIGAL.

The defendants here contend that the conduct on the
part of one of plaintiff's attorneys in arguing "that it was
negligence on the part of the defendants to permit the opening on the wall known as the alcove, to remain there as an
inducement for boys of the age of fourteen years or thereabouts to sit." It is the defendant's contention that this
argument upon the part of counsel puts before the jury
the doctrine of "attractive nuisance." The defendants rely
upon the case of Kerby vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company, (Idaho) 264 Pacific 377. In that case the court
held:
"An attorney should confine his arguments to
the issues and the evidence adduced, and to inferences which can legitimately be drawn therefrom,
and not go outside the record in an effort to prejudice
the rights of the opposing party."
The remark by counsel certainly is a legitimate inference that can be drawn and adduced from the evidence
in this case. Any platform or raise above the usual seats
which would give a person sitting there a better view of the
wrestling matches would certainly be an inducement to a
person to want to sit there and particularly would it be an
inducement to younger persons.
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As was disclosed by the evidence in this matter, the
platform was not only an inducement to plaintiffs but was
to persons of mature ages.
The defendants further complain that the court should
have instructed the jury that the matter suggested in counsel's argument was not an element in the case and that the
jury should disregard it.
See what the court told the jury (Tr. 385) where the
court stated to the jury that the issues in the case were set
forth in the instructions and that the jury were the sole
judges of the facts. What more could the court have told
the jury? The doctrine of "attractive nuisance" was not
involved in this case and the remark made by counsel for
plaintiff does not raise the doctrine or attempt to bring
the case at bar within it. It is merely a statement of an
inference which could reasonably be drawn from the facts
and especially in this case. There was nothing in the statement made by Mr. Tanner, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, that would or could in any way mislead the jury. The
defendants rely on the case of Jensen vs. Utah Railway
Company, 72 Ut. 366, 270 Pac. 349, in which case the court
held that counsel are required to accept the charge as given
by the court and yield obedience to it and are not permitted
to argue against it. There is nothing in the argument as
made by Mr. Tanner which is against the instructions as
given by the court and as was held in the case of Kerby vs.
Oregon Short Line (supra) and which the defendants rely
upon, an attorney is allowed to argue inferences which
legitimately can be adduced from the evidence. As was
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stated above, the platform or alcove being high above where
the wrestling matches took place and being a perfect place
to view the matches, would be an inducement to anyone to
want to sit there, and this certainly is all that was meant in
Mr. Tanner's argument.
We respectfully submit that the lower court did not
err in any of the particulars as claimed by the defendants
and that the verdict of the jury should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted
N.H. TANNER,
WILLARD HANSON,
STEWART M. HANSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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